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A COMPARISON OF TAX MORAL BETWEEN SPAIN AND TURKEY 
 
ABSTRACT 
Tax moral as an important issue in public finance is defined an intrinsic motivation of paying 
taxes, and it is closely related to tax compliance. Determinants of tax moral are needed to be 
investigated for a much comprehensive understanding of tax compliance. In this paper, 
determinants of tax moral in Turkey and Spain are searched based on World Values Survey 
data. Firstly, descriptive statistics of the variables used the models are provided. Tax moral is 
an ordered categorical dependent variable. Therefore, ordered probit models are estimated 
separately for Turkey and Spain to derive the relations between tax moral and relevant 
variables in these countries. Marginal effects are computed since the coefficients of the 
models cannot be interpreted because of the nonlinearity of the estimated models. Marginal 
effect indicates the change in the probality of specific tax moral category when an 
independent variable increases by one unit.  In practice, only marginal effects related to the 
top level of tax moral category are being evaluated. Demographic factors (gender, age, marital 
status), employing status, economic status (income level, finance satisfaction) and social 
capital variables (religiosity, confidence in government, confidence in justice system, 
confidence in parliament, confidence in civil services, education levels) are the independent 
variables that are used in the models. The effects of these variables on tax moral are searched 
in this paper. The findings from the estimated model suggest that social capital variables and 
some of the demographic factors have important effects on tax moral in Turkey.  Confidence 
variables have positive effect on tax moral; if taxpayers feel confidence in political entities 
they would be willing to pay taxes. Religion and national pride affect tax moral positively. On 
the other hand, things are somewhat different in Spain; generally speaking social capital 
variables do not have effects on tax moral, specifically confidence variables are found to be 
statistically insignificant. Age, education level and income level have significant effects on 
tax moral in Spain; level of tax moral increases as people gets older, the most educated 
individuals have higher tax moral than the least educated ones have, there is inverse relation 
between tax moral and income level, those who have high level of income has lower tax 
moral.  
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Introduction 
Tax evasion is an important issue in almost all countries. While some taxpayers seek 
the ways of evasion, the others are not eager to evade. Tax moral is, to large extent, to do with 
the physiological background of these behaviors. Arguably, tax moral is concerned with why 
people do not evade. There has been much in common between tax moral and tax compliance. 
Tax compliance is an observable action, that is most people pay their taxes. Tax compliance is 
not only a function of tax ratios and probability of detection, but also a function of an 
individual’s willingness to comply with and to evade.   As Torgler (2007) pointed out, level of 
tax compliance is relatively high when tax moral is high; therefore tax moral is needed for 
providing on an account of the puzzle of tax compliance.  
  
Determinants of tax moral are needed to be investigated for a much comprehensive 
understanding of tax compliance. Nevertheless, there is a limited work on the issue in the 
existing literature. (Torgler, 2004, 239). As Feld and Frey (2002, 88) suggest “Most studies 
treat ‘tax morale’ as a black box without discussing or even considering how it might arise or 
how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived as being part of the meta-preferences of 
taxpayers and used as the residuum in the analysis capturing unknown influences to tax 
evasion. The more interesting question then is which factors shape the emergence and 
maintenance of tax morale” Indeed, a few scholars conducted researches on tax moral in 
details.  
 
By definition, tax moral is an intrinsic motivation of paying taxes. (Torgler, 2007, 4). 
Morality could be defined as an individual’s internalization of such concept and legal rules to 
perform his or her social duties in a proper way. Hence, individuals’ general attitude (or tax 
mentality) towards taxation and specific liabilities imposed by the related legislation is 
substantial to the debate. From this perspective, tax moral is largely framed in the general 
concept of tax mentality. (Schmölders, 1976, 107).  
  
For Torgler (2004), tax moral measures taxpayers’ attitudes while tax evasion 
measures taxpayers’ behaviors. In other words, tax moral is not an outcome variable, like tax 
evasion. Tax moral can, hence, be defined as a moral obligation of paying taxes; it is, in turn a 
belief of contributing to society by paying taxes.  
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Determinants of Tax Moral 
Tax compliance and tax moral are affected by social and physiologic factors. 
Therefore increasing the level of tax moral and tax compliance depends heavily on these 
factors. Legal infrastructure and state’s enforcement power, to some extent, raise the level of 
tax compliance. Social and physiological factors are still decisive factors to change tax moral. 
For instance, social capital takes an important role part in this part. In other words, social 
capital evokes individuals’ economic and cultural capitals; perceptions on income 
distribution, on fairness in the society, trust on others and institutions, confidence in 
government and government policies are some of examples of social capital variables.  
 
Socio-demographic variables affect tax moral substantially. The first of them is the 
variable of age. Relatively older people are more vulnerable to threats of sanctions, suggested 
by the relevant studies. As Torgler (2007) points out, the reason is that people are attaining 
new social characteristics, such as property, status, dependency on others’ behaviors as they 
get older. Therefore the potential costs of penal sanctions for older people seem to be 
relatively greater. In consequence, there might be a significant relation between tax moral and 
age. Furthermore, socio-physiological studies reveal that females are more compliant and less 
selfish than males. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the traditional role of females is 
substantially different from the role of females in a modern society. Moreover, females have 
more risk averse behaviors than males have. Due to these reasons, tax moral might be higher 
for females than males. Marital status is another individualistic variable that might affect tax 
moral. The more social ties the individual has, the more restrictions imposed on her or his 
behavior. Thus married individuals are more prone to exhibit legal behaviors and hey might 
have higher level of tax moral.  
 
For Torgler (2007), employment status is another important factor for tax moral. It 
might be argued that self employed persons have lower tax moral than full time and part time 
employees. This might explained by the fact that self employed persons have more 
opportunities to evade tax. The relation between education level and tax moral is not clear. 
According to Torgler ve Schneider (2006), educated taxpayers are thought to have more 
information about tax regulations and fiscal relations. Besides, they might be aware of civil 
services provided by state, and so they might have high level of tax compliance. On the other 
hand, they seemingly have knowledge of public corruption and thereby they might have 
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critical perception on how tax revenues are used by government. Moreover, they know a lot 
about the opportunities to evade tax. As a result of these factors, it is assumed that they have a 
low level of tax moral. Consequently, there have been different kinds of relations between 
education level and tax moral. The relation between level of income and tax moral is a bit 
complicated and thus depends on some conditions. When people are not satisfied with their 
financial situation, they might tend to be evader. If a taxpayer feels a gap between his current 
and desired financial situation, he would be unwilling to pay taxes. Moreover, they would be 
more reluctant to pay taxes if they feel they have less when they compare their income and 
their wealth with others’.  On the contrary, Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000) claim that 
people who have low level of income are willing to pay taxes since they think they have 
benefit form public goods and services more than people having high level of income have 
benefit from. Wealthy people, on the other hand, would be less willingly pay taxes by the 
perception of having benefited from public goods and services less than others.    
 
Taxpayers’ confidences in parliament, government, justice system, tax administration 
have a valuable relation with tax moral. If the levels of these confidences are high enough, 
individuals’ loyalty to public administration would increase and so they would be more 
willingly to pay taxes.  In most of the empirical studies, these variables turn out to have 
significant relation with tax moral. Montero and Torcal, (2006) defines political disaffection 
as the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, lack of confidence in the political 
process, in politicians and in democratic institutions. In this context, political disaffection is 
expected to have negative effect on tax moral.  In addition, importance of politics and 
perception on democracy are important factors for explaining tax moral. People seem to be 
complying more in democratic countries, as they have the ability to affect tax and expenditure 
policies in these countries. National pride is another interesting factor that should be taken 
into account on the analyses about tax moral. When people are happy with their national 
identity, they would be more loyal to their countries, and therefore tax moral would be high. 
Religiosity is also affecting tax moral; indeed, positive relations between tax moral and 
religiosity have been found in some researches.  As Frank (1996) points out; tax compliance 
is more common among the people whose perception depends on moral and ethic codes.   
Religious people are so interested in what is right and what is wrong; therefore they believe 
that people have some duties to be performed: paying taxes is one of these duties.  
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Previous Empirical Literature 
 
Studies on tax moral can be evaluated in two categories. The studies in the first group 
have focused on only one country; they have analyzed regional discrepancies and changes in 
time. (Torgler (2005), Martinez-Vazquez adn Torgler (2009), Prieto, J., Sanzo, M. J. and 
Suarez-Pandiello, J. (2006)) For the second group of studies, studies conducted in a 
comprehensive perspective with more countries included (Torgler and Schneider (2006), Alm 
and Torgler (2006), Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler (2006)). In these 
articles two or three countries were taken into account. Torgler (2006), Alm and Torgler 
(2006) have used wider set of data with many countries.  
 
All studies on tax moral and its determinants used the international databases such as 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), World Values Survey (WVS), European 
Values Survey (EVS) and African Opinion Survey (Afrobarometer).  
 
Alm and Torgler (2005) compared tax moral levels of USA with Spain by using 1990 
and 1995 WVS data that concluded that tax moral level in USA is higher. An explanation of 
their result might be that “compliance” as a social norm is better in USA when compared in 
Spain.  A further comparative study conducted by Alm ve Torgler (2006) analyzed tax moral 
in 14 European countries and USA by using WVS data in 1990-1993; they still found that the 
highest tax moral is in USA. In both of these articles, weighted ordered probit model was 
estimated to get the results.  
 
Torgler and Schneider (2006) have a similar research analyzing Spain, Switzerland 
and Belgium, by using the 1995-1997 WVS and 1999-2000 EVS data. They estimated 
weighted ordered probit model in which the variables of gender, age, marital status, 
education, employment status, social class, income level, attendance to church, direct 
democracy, national pride, confidence in political institutions and government, participation 
in democracy, income tax rate, fine rate and probality of detection are used as independent 
variables. The regional discrepancies in Spain and Switzerland affect tax moral, females have 
higher tax moral than males. They concluded that confidence in justice system, confidence in 
government, confidence in parliament, national pride, attitudes supporting democracy have 
positive effect on tax moral. 
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Torgler (2006) looked at the determinants of tax moral in 32 (including Spain 
countries by using the WVS data of 1995-1997. The included variables into the weighted 
ordered probit model are gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, social 
class, financial situation, risk averness, religiosity, corruption and credibility. The author 
found out that religiosity in particular for the Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists increases tax 
moral. Risk averness and financial satisfaction positively affect tax moral. Tax moral is low 
for the high-class, and it is high for the retired, housewives, and the part-time employed. In 
addition, females and married people have high tax moral. On the contrary, there is a negative 
relation between education and tax moral; perception on level corruption decreases tax moral.  
 
Similar researches were conducted by Cummings et al (2006) analyzing Botswana an 
South Africa by using Afronarometer data of 1999 and 2000; Gokbunar, Selim ve Yanıkkaya 
(2007) on Turkey by using EVS data of 2002; Martínez-Vázquez ve Torgler (2009) on Spain 
by using WVS and EVS data of 1981,1990,1995 and 1999-2000. These scholars provided 
similar results about the determinants of tax moral; tax moral level heavily depends on socio-
demographic and social capital factors.  
 
Kaynar-Bilgin (2011) searched for the determinants of tax moral in Turkey by using 
the WVS data of 2005-2008. The included variables for probit model are gender, age, marital 
status, education, employment status, income level, financial satisfaction, religiosity, national 
pride, confidence in government, justice system and parliament, importance of politics and 
religiosity. The author found out that religiosity, importance of religiosity, importance of 
politics, national pride, confidence in government positively affect tax moral. Tax moral is 
low for the unemployed.  
 
The Model 
The methods used by the empirical studies are fairly similar since tax moral is a 
categorical variable.  In general, ordered probit models were preferred to use in determining 
the relations and the interactions between tax moral and personal, socio-economic factors. 
Ordered probit models are very useful to analyze dependent variable of tax moral containing 
ordering information. Therefore, the same estimation method is used in this paper.  
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 The magnitudes of estimation are not interpreted, only the signs are analyzed because 
equation in ordered probit model is in the nonlinear form.  Thus marginal effects should be 
derived to determine the effect of each variable on tax moral. Marginal effect indicates the 
probality of specific tax moral category when an independent variable increases by one unit.  
In practice, only marginal effects related to the top level of tax moral category have been 
evaluated.    
 
For this paper, WVS database is used to analyze the level of tax moral and its 
determinants in Turkey and Spain. The fifth wave of the WVS is used for this aim.  
 
WVS is a survey which researched socio-cultural and political changes in a global 
base. The fourth and fifth waves have more than 50 countries representing approximately 80 
% of the world population.  In this survey, individuals are asked to respond the following 
question to evaluate level of tax moral; 
 
Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between: … ‘Cheating on tax if you have the chance’. The 
question leads to a ten-scale index of tax morale with the two extreme points ‘never justified’ 
and ‘always justified’. 
 
In the ten-scale index “1” refers to “never justified” and “10” refers to “always 
justified”. The responds close to “1” can be thought as respectively high level of tax moral 
while the ones close to “10” indicate low level of tax moral. The ten-scale index of tax moral 
is transformed into four-scale index (0,1,2,3) by the same method used in the related studies. 
In the transformed scale “0” implies “always justified” and “3” implies “never justified” The 
responds in the interval 4-10 in the original scale become “0” in the new scale since they 
imply that people justify tax cheating anyhow. Besides “never justified” option “1” in the 
original scale now is “3” 
 
 
Determinants of Tax Moral in Spain:  
First of all, the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are derived. 
Table 1 shows these statistics. The rates of persons having specific properties in the whole 
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population are as follows; female 50 %, married 58 %, age interval of 30-49 36 %, age 
interval of 50-98 40 %, age interval of 16-29 24 %. Education level 2 is 20 %, education level 
3 is 16 %, education level of 4 is 8 %. Of the respondents 3.9 % is the part time employed, 7.7 
% is the self employed, 19 % is the retired, 17 % is housewife, 7 % is student, 4.6 % is 
unemployed.   When it comes to the variable of tax moral, 63 % of the individuals have the 
highest tax moral level. These individuals respond as cheating on tax is never justifiable. The 
rates of the levels 3 and 2 are 10 % and 6 % respectively. The rate of people saying cheating 
is always justifiable is 19 %.  The rates of income levels are 34% for level 1, 43% for level 2, 
21% for level 3, 3% for level 4. The rates of financial satisfaction for the level 1, 2, 3 and 4 
are 10%, 30%, 43% and 17% respectively. The variables of religiosity and national pride give 
the relatively high values as 44% and 92%. Besides 14% of them thinks that religion is 
important. The ratio of respondents considering politics is an important issue is relatively low, 
7.7%. Other figures are as follow; confidence in justice system 54%, confidence in 
government 44% and confidence in parliament 49% and confidence in civil services %39. 
Among the social capital variables, national pride has the highest figure; 92 % of the 
respondents proud of their national identity.  Confidences in entities of the political system are 
relatively high; from 39% to 54%.  
 
Table 2 gives the results of the estimated ordered probit model for Spain. In this 
estimation, the dependent variable is tax moral variable as defined earlier. The independent 
variables are social capital variables, demographic variables, variables related to employment 
status, and economic situation variables. The second column indicates the estimated 
coefficient for each independent variable. The coefficients cannot be directly interpreted since 
the model is nonlinear. Yet the signs of each coefficient can be evaluated. In the third and 
fourth column, there are associated standard errors and z-statistics for each variable 
respectively. The statistical significances of the variables are determined by using the z-
statistics. In the last column, the marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable are given. These effects are the ones related to the top level of tax moral 
category (Y = 3). Moreover, the specification test statistics are given at the end. The results 
points out that the model is statistically significant.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Spain 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tax Morale (level 1) 0.195833  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 2) 0.064416  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 3) 0.102500  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 4) 0.637500  0 1 
1) Social Capital 
Importance of Politics 0.077500 0.267495 0 1 
Importance of Religion 0.147500 0.354751 0 1 
Confidence in Justice System 0.540000 0.498605 0 1 
Confidence in Government 0.440833 0.496694 0 1 
Confidence in Parliament 0.491667 0.500139 0 1 
Confidence in Civil Services 0.390000 0.487953 0 1 
Religiosity 0.440833 0.496694 0 1 
National Pride 0.920833 0.270111 0 1 
Education (level 2) 0.206667 0.405083 0 1 
Education (level 3) 0.160833 0.367530 0 1 
Education (level 4) 0.076666 0.266173 0 1 
2)Demographic Factors 
Sex (Female) 0.500000 0.500208 0 1 
30-49 Age Interval 0.362500 0.480923 0 1 
50-98 Age Interval 0.408333 0.491730 0 1 
Marital Status (Married) 0.585000 0.492927 0 1 
3) Employment Status 
Part time 0.039166 0.194072 0 1 
Self employed 0.077500 0.267495 0 1 
Retired 0.195833 0.397006 0 1 
Housewife 0.170833 0.376520 0 1 
Student 0.074166 0.262151 0 1 
Unemployed 0.046666 0.211012 0 1 
Private  0.565833 0.495854 0 1 
4) Economic Status 
Income Level (level 2) 0.431667 0.495515 0 1 
Income Level (level 3) 0.211667 0.408660 0 1 
Income Level (level 4) 0.029166 0.168344 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 2) 0.300833 0.458812 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 3) 0.430833 0.495399 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 4) 0.170000 0.375789 0 1 
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Table 2: Ordered Probit Model Estimation for Spain  
Independent Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
      z-value 
Marginal 
Effects 
1) Social Capital 
Importance of Politics  
Importance of Religion  
Confidence in Justice System  
Confidence in Government 
Confidence in Parliament 
Confidence in Civil Services 
Religiosity 
National Pride  
Education (level 2) 
Education (level 3) 
Education (level 4) 
2) Demographic Factors 
Female 
30-49 Age Interval  
50-98 Age Interval  
Married 
3) Employment Status 
Part time  
Self employed  
Retired  
Housewife  
Student  
Unemployed 
Private Sector 
4) Economic Status 
Income Level (level 2) 
Income Level (level 3) 
Income Level (level 4) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 2) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 3) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 4) 
 
Number of Observations  
Prob (ChiSqd>value) 
Information Criterion (AIC) 
Pseudo R
2 
 
-0.193061 
0.176889 
0.058499 
-0.051011 
-0.020400 
0.076616 
0.135098* 
0.379701*** 
0.060485 
0.150077 
0.552271*** 
 
-0.088738 
0.349768*** 
0.294453** 
0.039771 
 
0.151088 
-0.229823 
0.137709 
0.181493 
0.418436** 
0.246105 
0.111949 
 
0.007230 
-0.043904 
-0.399906* 
-0.171399 
-0.191946 
-0.328749** 
 
1200 
0.000000 
2.02991 
0.026466 
 
 
0.135398 
0.115744 
0.079132 
0.084690 
0.087950 
0.081206 
0.080430 
0.133833 
0.104411 
0.120894 
0.158983 
 
0.082358 
0.112433 
0.133045 
0.087424 
 
0.194842 
0.156199 
0.131056 
0.138894 
0.175769 
0.190259 
0.091400 
 
0.090271 
0.111705 
0.231603 
0.141282 
0.140196 
0.157227 
 
-1.426 
1.528 
0.739 
-0.602 
-0.232 
0.943 
1.680 
2.837 
0.579 
1.241 
3.474 
 
-1.077 
3.111 
2.213 
0.455 
 
0.775 
-1.471 
1.051 
1.307 
2.381 
1.294 
1.225 
 
0.080 
-0.393 
-1.727 
-1.213 
-1.369 
-2.091 
 
 
-0.0739 
0.0644 
0.0219 
-0.0191 
-0.0076 
0.0285 
0.0503 
0.1475 
0.0224 
0.0549 
0.1828 
 
-0.0331 
0.1276 
0.1085 
0.0149 
 
0.0548 
-0.0883 
0.0506 
0.0661 
0.1434 
0.0875 
0.0419 
 
0.0027 
-0.0165 
-0.1561 
-0.0647 
-0.0719 
-0.1264 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group 
are age 16–29, man, unmarried, full time employed, public sector, education (level 1), income 
level (level 1), financial satisfaction (level 1) 
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Most of the social capital variables appear to be statistically insignificant; importance 
of politics, importance of religion, confidence in justice system, confidence in government, 
confidence in parliament, and confidence in civil services do not have effect on tax moral in 
this sample level. The estimated coefficients of the variables of national pride and education 
level 4 are statistically significant at 1% level while the one of the religiosity is significant at 
5% level; besides they are all positive. These findings imply that national pride and religiosity 
have positive effect on tax moral. Moreover, the most educated people have higher tax moral. 
The estimated coefficient of the highest level of education has the biggest marginal effect 
among the significant social capital variables; it is 0.18 
 
According to the estimated model, gender and marital status seem to have nothing to 
do with tax moral. Age interval coefficients, on the other hand, are fairly significant and their 
signs are positive implying that tax moral is higher for elderly persons. The marginal effect 
belonging to the variable 30-49 age interval is 0.12; being in the highest level of education 
category increases the probability of being at the top level of tax moral by 0.12 units 
comparing to the lowest level of education. When it comes to the employment status, the 
results are not remarkable; all of the variables in this category except student are not 
significant. Students have higher tax moral than full time employers have.  
 
Interestingly, respondents who are at the top level of income are turned out to have 
lower tax moral than the lowest group has. In addition to this, financial satisfaction variable 
has a negative significant effect on tax moral. The highest level of this category has a 
statistically significant estimated coefficient.  
 
Determinants of Tax Moral in Turkey:  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables. Of the respondents 49% is female, 
66% is married, 41% is in 30-49 age interval, 17% is in 50-98 age interval and 42% is in 16-
29 age interval. Rates of education level 1, 2, 3 and 4 are 52%, 10%, 27% and 11%.  The 
figures about employment status: full time employed 30%, part time employed 2%, self 
employed 13%, retired 9%, student 8% and unemployed 6%. Religiosity and national pride 
figures are relatively high; 805 and 89%. Confidence in the entities of political system is 
lower when comparing them in Spain. Income level rates indicate that the biggest part of the 
people is in the lowest income level; 64% of them are in level 1. It is followed by level 2, 
level 3 and level 4; 18%, 8% and 10%.  74% of the respondents think religion is important,  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables for Turkey 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Tax Morale (level 1) 0.034201  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 2) 0.037175  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 3) 0.119703  0 1 
Tax Morale (level 4) 0.809822  0 1 
1) Social Capital 
Importance of Politics 0.131599 0.338180 0 1 
Importance of Religion 0.748699 0.433923 0 1 
Confidence in Justice System 0.353903 0.478358 0 1 
Confidence in Government 0.260967 0.439325 0 1 
Confidence in Parliament 0.203717 0.402911 0 1 
Confidence in Civil Services 0.099628 0.299615 0 1 
Religiosity 0.805204 0.396191 0 1 
National Pride 0.899628 0.300607 0 1 
Education (level 2) 0.105576 0.307409 0 1 
Education (level 3) 0.278810 0.448581 0 1 
Education (level 4) 0.111524 0.314897 0 1 
2)Demographic Factors 
Sex (Female) 0.498141 0.500183 0 1 
30-49 Age Interval 0.418587 0.493511 0 1 
50-98 Age Interval 0.178439 0.383024 0 1 
Marital Status (Married) 0.662454 0.473049 0 1 
3) Employment Status 
Part time 0.027509 0.163623 0 1 
Self employed 0.133829 0.340595 0 1 
Retired 0.094423 0.292526 0 1 
Housewife 0.343494 0.475051 0 1 
Student 0.088475 0.284091 0 1 
Unemployed 0.060966 0.239358 0 1 
Private  0.446840 0.497351 0 1 
4) Economic Status 
Income Level (level 2) 0.180669 0.384887 0 1 
Income Level (level 3) 0.088475 0.284091 0 1 
Income Level (level 4) 0.101115 0.301593 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 2) 0.231227 0.421774 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 3) 0.406691 0.491399 0 1 
Financial Satisfaction (level 4) 0.228996 0.420343 0 1 
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Model Estimation for Turkey  
Independent Variables Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
      z-value 
Marginal 
Effects 
1) Social Capital 
Importance of Politics  
Importance of Religion  
Confidence in Justice System  
Confidence in Government 
Confidence in Parliament 
Confidence in Civil Services 
Religiosity 
National Pride  
Education (level 2) 
Education (level 3) 
Education (level 4) 
2) Demographic Factors 
Female 
30-49 Age Interval  
50-98 Age Interval  
Married 
3) Employment Status 
Part time  
Self employed  
Retired  
Housewife  
Student  
Unemployed 
Private Sector 
4) Economic Status 
Income Level (level 2) 
Income Level (level 3) 
Income Level (level 4) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 2) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 3) 
Financial Satisfaction (level 4) 
 
Number of Observations  
Prob (ChiSqd>value) 
Information Criterion (AIC) 
Pseudo R
2 
 
0.369703*** 
0.435832*** 
0.176320* 
0.296404** 
-0.022028 
-0.059884 
0.299047*** 
0.447546*** 
0.040732 
0.068301 
0.271146 
 
0.045841 
-0.041882 
0.038892 
0.114222 
 
-0.124043 
-0.087781 
0.040662 
-0.121057 
0.123917 
-0.417013** 
0.186067* 
 
-0.163385 
-0.076305 
0.083103 
0.131735 
-0.002190 
0.008572 
 
1345 
0.0000000 
1.27499 
0.073878 
 
0.133793 
0.097435 
0.105660 
0.125291 
0.134359 
0.161653 
0.105325 
0.125907 
0.142562 
0.118135 
0.167764 
 
0.123619 
0.106269 
0.157216 
0.110406 
 
0.242470 
0.142623 
0.190237 
0.166322 
0.182094 
0.171534 
0.109411 
 
0.108557 
0.150657 
0.158473 
0.140117 
0.131878 
0.143839 
 
2.763 
4.473 
1.669 
2.366 
-0.164 
-0.370 
2.839 
3.555 
0.286 
0.578 
1.616 
 
0.371 
-0.394 
0.247 
1.035 
 
-0.512 
-0.615 
0.214 
-0.728 
0.681 
-2.431 
1.701 
 
-1.505 
-0.506 
0.524 
0.940 
-0.017 
0.060 
 
0.0815 
0.1213 
0.0435 
0.0699 
-0.0056 
-0.0155 
0.0821 
0.1318 
0.0101 
0.0170 
0.0617 
 
0.0116 
-0.0106 
0.0097 
0.0294 
 
-0.0331 
-0.0229 
0.0101 
-0.0312 
0.0298 
-0.1232 
0.0466 
 
-0.0434 
-0.0199 
0.0204 
0.0322 
-0.0006 
0.0022 
Notes: Dependent variable: tax morale on a four-point scale (0 to 3). In the reference group 
are age 16–29, man, unmarried, full time employed, public sector, education (level 1), income 
level (level 1), financial satisfaction (level 1) 
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13% percent of them think politics is important in their life. About tax moral level, level 4 
gives the highest rate which is 80%. That is 80% of respondents find that cheating on taxes is 
never justifiable. Besides, only 3% of them says that it is always justifiable.    
 
The ordered probit model is indicated by Table 4. The dependent variable is tax moral 
level, the independent ones are the variables related to social capital, demographic factors, 
employment status and economic situation. The model is statistically significant model since 
the probability value of chi-square is much less 0.01.   
 
The important part of the social capital variables appear to be statistically significant. 
Importance of politics, importance of religion, religiosity, national pride are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficients for the variables of confidence in 
government and confidence in justice system are significant at 5% and 10% levels.  
 
The marginal effect of the importance of politics on tax moral is 0.08. Considering 
politics as an important factor increases the probability of being at the top level of tax moral 
by 0.08 units. In other words people interested in politics have higher tax moral. Politics is a 
kind of tool to take part in the political structure in democratic countries.  The existence of 
democratic mechanism increases the political interest. Taxation is also evaluated in this 
political context. The importance of politics has a positive effect on tax moral.  
 
Marginal effect of confidence in justice system on tax moral is 0.04 and it is positive. 
People trusting on justice system have high tax moral. The same applies to the confidence in 
government. The more confidence in government implies the higher tax moral. Taxpayers’ 
confidence in government means that they approve government’s taxation policies and its 
related decisions since governments are the entities formulating tax policies. The marginal 
effects of the importance of religion and the religiosity are 0.12 and 0.08 respectively. In this 
case, it might be said that religion affect tax moral positively. As an explanation of this, it can 
be said that religion extensively covers the beliefs about the right behavior. According to Hull 
(2000) religion has the ability to prevent illegal behaviors since it legitimizes and reinforces 
social values. Paying taxes is seen as a social norm and it is motivated by religion. The 
marginal effect of national pride is 0.13, so it is positive and among the biggest marginal 
effects. It is clear that national pride supports tax moral. When people are satisfied with their 
national identities, they are usually devoted to their states and governments.  
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All of the demographic factors are not statistically significant. Among the employment 
status factors, only unemployed and private sector have effect on tax moral. While the 
unemployed persons have less tax moral, private sector employers have higher tax moral than 
public sector employers. When it comes to the category of economic status, none of these 
factors can be evaluated as the determinants of tax moral since the related estimations are not 
statistically significant at any level.  
 
The estimated model points out that the most effective factors on tax moral in Turkey 
are the factors of social capital. When compared with the individualistic variables, the 
variables related to social capital have stronger relations with tax moral. The feeling of 
confidence, religiosity and national pride seem to be very important to understand the concept 
of tax moral in Turkey. In other words what persons feel about themselves and how much 
they trust on social entities are strongly related the level of tax moral.  
 
Comparing these findings with the ones derived from Spain’s model indicates that the 
determinants of tax moral in two countries are not so similar. Contrary to Turkey case, 
confidences in political entities are not explaining the tax moral in Spain. Religion does not 
have an important role as in Turkey. Under the social capital title, only national pride an 
education level 4 have the real meaning on tax moral. Tax moral in Spain is more related to 
the individualistic factors while it is a social confidence phenomenon in Turkey. Age, 
education, income level and financial satisfaction are significant in Spain.  
 
Conclusion 
 The determinants of tax moral were analyzed by estimating ordered probit model for 
Spain and Turkey. For this aim, we estimated two models for each country.  In the first model 
for Spain, the variables of religiosity, national pride, education level 4, 30-49 age interval, 50-
98 age interval, student, income level 4, financial satisfaction level 4 found to be statistically 
significant at different significant levels. That is, all these variables have effects on tax moral 
in different degrees. In Spain, mostly individualistic factors are explaining tax moral. As 
social capital variables, only national pride and one part of education level have strong effect 
on tax moral. Religiosity is significant at only 10% level.  
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The second model for Turkey indicates that the variables of the importance of religion, 
importance of politics, confidence in justice system, confidence in government, religiosity, 
national pride, unemployed, private sector are statistically significant. The perception on 
religion and politics, confidence in justice system, confidence in government, being religious, 
having national pride, working for the private sector have positive effects on tax moral. The 
unemployed has lower tax moral.  
 
The first and second models give different results that suggest the different structures 
of tax morals in Spain and Turkey. The estimations based on the WVS data for Spain and 
Turkey indicates that tax moral in Turkey can be seen as a social phenomenon; in other 
words, social capital variables have positive effects on tax moral. Personal factors such as 
gender, age, being self employed or retired, income level and financial satisfaction seem to be 
irrelevant with tax moral. On the contrary, age, income level, financial satisfaction and 
education level seem to have effects on tax moral in Spain. It can be said that tax moral in 
Spain is highly related to individualistic conditions when compared tax moral in Turkey.  
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APPENDIX 
Definition of Variables 
 
 
Variable                                 Definition 
TAX MORAL Please tell me for the following statement whether you 
think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between: … ‘Cheating on tax if you have 
the chance’  
     (3=never justified 0=always justified) 
0    4,5,6,7,8,9,10 
1 3 
2 2 
3 1 
 
GENDER                                           0   male 
1   female  
 
AGE How old are you? 
1 18-29 
2 30-49 
3 50-98 
 
MARITAL STATUS 0 Unmarried (living together as married, divorced,       
separated, widowed, single/never married)  
1 Married 
 
EDUCATION level  1 (no formal; inadequately completed elementary;       
completed elementary; incomplete secondary) 
level  2 (intermediate vocational; intermediate general)  
level  3 (maturity level; higher education)  
level   4 (university with degree) 
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EMPLOYMENT STATUS Are you employed now or not?  
1    full time  
     2    part time  
3 Self employed i 
4 retired 
5 housewife  
6 student  
7 unemployed 
 
IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION How important is religion in your life? 
0    not at all important; not very important 
                                                           1    very important; rather important 
 
RELIGIOSITY Independently whether you go to church or not, would 
you say you are? 
0   not a religious; a convinced atheist, other  
     1   religious 
 
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICS  How important is politics in your life? 
0    not at all important; not very important 
                                                           1     very important; rather important 
 
NATIONAL PRIDE How proud are you to be (nationality)?  
0 Not at all; not very  
1 Very; quite 
 
CONFIDENCE IN JUSTICE  
SYSTEM How much confidence do you have in justice system? 
0 none at all; not very much; quite a lot  
1   a great deal 
 
 
CONFIDENCE IN  
GOVERNMENT  How much confidence do you have in government? 
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0 none at all; not very much; quite a lot  
1   a great deal 
 
 
CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENT How much confidence do you have in parliament? 
0 none at all; not very much; quite a lot  
1   a great deal 
 
CONFIDENCE IN CIVIL  
SERVICES  How much confidence do you have in civil services? 
0 none at all; not very much; quite a lot  
1   a great deal 
 
SCALE OF INCOMES  Scale of incomes? 
 Level 1 (lower step; second step, third step) 
 Level 2 (fourth; fifth)  
 Level 3 (sixth; seven) 
 Level 4 (nineth; tenth) 
  
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION          How satisfied are you with the financial situation of 
yous household?  
      0    1,2,3 
      1    4,5 
 2    6,7 
 3    8,9,10 
 
INSTITUTION OF OCCUPATION 0 Public Sector 
 1 Private Sector 
